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I. INTRODUCTION
In Alden v. Maine2 the Supreme Court considered whether Congress, pursuant to
its Article I powers, can subject a nonconsenting state to a private suit for damages in
the state’s own courts. Alternatively viewed, the question was whether a state has
sovereign immunity which precludes such suits. The petitioners were employees of
the State of Maine who sought monetary damages from the State for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),3 which specifically authorized such a suit.
The Maine courts had dismissed the suit on sovereign immunity grounds.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Article I of the Constitution does not
grant Congress the power to subject a nonconsenting state to a private suit for
damages in the state's own courts.4 The Court explained that state immunity to
private suits “neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh
1

B.S., University of Florida; J.D., summa cum laude, Michigan State University – Detroit
College of Law, 2001. I would like to thank Professor Susan H. Bitensky of Michigan State
University – Detroit College of Law for her insightful criticism and advice throughout the
development of this article.
2

527 U.S. 706 (1999).

3

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-207 (1994).

4

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
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Amendment.”5 Rather, such immunity “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed” prior to entering the federal system.6 The states retain this
immunity “except as altered by the plan of the [Constitutional] Convention or certain
constitutional amendments.”7 This is implicit in the federal structure and confirmed
by the Tenth Amendment.8 The decision represents a direct extension of the
federalism developed by the Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,9 and is
philosophically consistent with other recent “states rights” cases such as New York v.
United States,10 and Printz v. United States.11
This note will review the history of state sovereign immunity and congressional
power to subject states to lawsuits. Next, this note will examine the holdings and
opinions in Alden. Finally, the underlying basis for the Alden decision will be
analyzed.
II. BACKGROUND
12

Alden v. Maine represents the most recent major development in a long-running
debate about the nature and extent of state sovereign immunity under the
Constitution. Article III of the Constitution provides that “the judicial Power [of the
United States] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority . . . [and] to Controversies . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State.”13 It provides further that “In all Cases . . . in which a
State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”14 By its
text then, Article III taken alone appears to confer both federal question and diversity
jurisdiction on the federal courts when a state is a party to a suit. The meaning of
this text and its relationship to congressional powers granted elsewhere in the
Constitution are at the heart of the sovereign immunity debate.
Disagreement about state sovereign immunity dates back to the pre-ratification
period. At that time, many states were saddled with Revolutionary War debt and
were thus “vitally interested” in whether, under Article III, they would be subject to
federal court suits on these debts.15 Consequently, the ratification debates addressed

5

Id. at 713.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

See id. at 713-14.

9

517 U.S. 44 (1996).

10

505 U.S. 144 (1992).

11

521 U.S. 898 (1997).

12

527 U.S. 706 (1999).

13

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).

14

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).

15

See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418 (1979).
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the state sovereign immunity question primarily within the context of this potential
debt enforcement.16
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 81, considered whether, under Article
III, “an assignment of the public securities of one State to the citizens of another,
would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts.”17 His position was
that:
[I]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent . . . . Unless, therefore, there is a
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.18
Although Hamilton was “plainly talking about a suit subject to a federal court’s
jurisdiction under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article III,”19 he did not
specifically reconcile the apparent conflict between his position and Article III’s
diversity jurisdiction language. In supporting and expanding on Hamilton’s theme at
the Virginia ratifying convention, however, James Madison suggested that the
purpose of the citizen-state diversity jurisdiction clause was to provide for federal
jurisdiction only when a state was a plaintiff, not a defendant, or when a state
otherwise consented to suit.20 John Marshall, speaking after Madison at the Virginia
convention, likewise argued that the clause was only intended to cover suits in which
a state was the plaintiff.21
Disputing the views of Madison and Marshall in favor of the plain meaning of
the text of Article III, Edmund Randolph argued that “any doubt respecting the
construction that a state may be a plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the
words where a state shall be a party.”22 Similarly, James Wilson expressed a strong
anti-immunity position at the Pennsylvania Convention, arguing that the concept of
impartiality inherent in the Constitution requires a federal forum in which individuals
and states receive equal treatment.23 Wilson's view was “that the sovereignty resides
in the people; they have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of
the power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare.”24

16

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 772-73 (Souter, J., dissenting).

17

THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 125 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Walter Dunne ed. 1901).

18

Id. at 125-26.

19

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 144-45 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).

20

See 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter
ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; Alden, 527 U.S. at 718 (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 533); Alden, 527 U.S.
at 776 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 533).
21

See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555; Alden, 527 U.S. at 718 (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555);
Alden, 527 U.S. at 776 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555).
22

Alden, 527 U.S. at 776 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 573).

23

See id. at 777 (citing 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 491).

24

Id. (citing 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 443).
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The ratification debates did not resolve the issue.25 Consequently, to hedge their
positions, some states in their formal ratification documents issued declarations or
proposed amendments which specifically provided for some form of state immunity
in federal court.26 The New York and Rhode Island Conventions declared that “the
judicial power of the United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not
extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person against a
state.”27 The Rhode Island Convention went on to propose that
[t]o remove all doubts or controversies respecting the same, . . . it be
especially expressed, as a part of the Constitution of the United States,
that Congress shall not, directly or indirectly, either by themselves or
through the judiciary, interfere with any one of the states . . . in liquidating
and discharging the public securities of any one state.28
The Virginia and North Carolina conventions proposed amendments which would
have entirely eliminated the diversity jurisdiction language in Article III.29
Despite this early disagreement, Article III was ratified with the disputed
jurisdictional provisions intact.30 Two years later, the Judiciary Act of 1789
incorporated this language in its grant of authority to the Supreme Court, providing:
[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its
citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states and
aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction.31
The meaning of the diversity jurisdiction language in Article III and the Judiciary
Act went untested for five years32 until the case of Chisholm v. Georgia33 reached the
United States Supreme Court.
In Chisholm, the question was presented in the form of a motion to compel an
appearance by the State of Georgia, on danger of default, in a common law
assumpsit action brought in federal court against the State by Chisholm, a citizen of

25

See id. at 778.

26

See id. at 718, 778-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).

27

Alden, 527 U.S. at 778-79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 329, 336).

28

Id. at 779-80 (citing 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 336).

29

See id. at 724-25, 780 (Souter, J., dissenting).

30

See id. at 778 n.18 (Souter, J., dissenting).

31

Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789).

32

In an earlier case, Van Stophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. 401 (1791), the State of Maryland
was sued by a foreign citizen for debts owed by the state. Maryland submitted to process and
subsequently settled the case rather than risking an adverse ruling on immunity. See Alden,
527 U.S. at 789 n.25 (Souter, J., dissenting).
33

2 U.S. 419 (1793).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/6

4

2000]

ALDEN v. MAINE AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

507

South Carolina, to collect on a Revolutionary War debt.34 The Governor and
Attorney General of Georgia had been served with notice,35 but the state “refuse[d] to
appear and answer. . . [arguing] she [was] a sovereign State and therefore not liable
to such actions.”36 The Court rejected this immunity defense and granted the motion
in what was effectively a four-to-one majority decision.37 The four concurring
Justices, in individual opinions, essentially found that the Constitution meant what it
said. They all found a clear authorization for citizen-state diversity jurisdiction in
the text of Article III.38 Each rejected a construction of this text which would allow a
grant of jurisdiction only when a state was a plaintiff and not a defendant.39
Additionally, at least two of the concurring Justices believed that the concept of state
sovereign immunity advanced by Georgia was inconsistent with the principle of
popular sovereignty on which the Constitution was based.40
Justice Iredell, the lone dissenter, argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction.
However, his argument was not based on a theory of constitutional state sovereign
immunity, but rather, on the grounds that Congress had not conferred jurisdiction on
the federal courts over unconsenting states. He noted that although the Judiciary Act
provided for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over all civil controversies
“between a State and citizens of another State”41 it went on to provide that any writs
issued by the federal courts not specifically provided for by statute must be
“agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”42 Justice Iredell interpreted this
latter language as directing the Court to issue non-statutory writs only in accordance
with the law of a particular state or “[p]rinciples of law common to all the States”

34

See id. at 419-20. See also, Atascadero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 281 (1985) (“Chisholm
was an action in assumpsit by a citizen of South Carolina for the price of military goods sold
to Georgia in 1777.").
35

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419.

36

Id. at 469.

37

See id. at 479.

38
See, e.g., id. at 466 (Justice Wilson concurring) (“[W]e may safely conclude . . . that the
State of Georgia is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court . . . . [T]his doctrine . . . is
confirmed, beyond all doubt, by the direct and explicit declaration of the Constitution itself.”).
39

See, e.g., id. at 476 (Jay, C.J., concurring)
If the Constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those controversies in
which a State might be a Plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citizens had
demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it should have attempted to convey
that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also repugnant to it.
40

See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470-71 (Jay, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he people exercised
. . . their own proper sovereignty. . . establishing a Constitution by which it was their will, that
the State Governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made
to conform.”); id. at 454 (Wilson, J. concurring) (“To the Constitution of the United States the
term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown. There is but one place it could have been used with
propriety. . . . [The framers] might have announced themselves ‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the
United States . . .”).
41

Id. at 431 (Iredell, J., dissenting).

42

Id. at 434.
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derived from the common law.43 Believing that no state authorized compulsory suits
for damages against itself, and that state sovereign immunity was a part of the
existing common law, Justice Iredell argued that any contrary holding by the
Supreme Court would violate the terms of the Judiciary Act.44 Because he based his
dissent on the terms of the Judiciary Act, Justice Iredell specifically reserved
judgment on the question of whether Congress had the power to abrogate this
common law immunity.45
The Chisholm decision proved immediately controversial as it directly affected
the ability of the states to revoke their war debts.46 In response, “the proposal
adopted as the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in the Senate” soon
afterwards.47 This proposal received prompt attention and “little more than two
months after its introduction it had been endorsed by both Houses and forwarded to
the States”48 which adopted the Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”49 By its text, which closely tracks
language in Article III, the Amendment appears to be specifically directed toward
eliminating federal citizen-state diversity jurisdiction.50 Whether the Eleventh

43

Id.

44

See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 436-37.

45

Id. at 449.
But it is of extreme moment that no Judge should rashly commit himself upon
important questions, which it is unnecessary for him to decide. My opinion being, that
even if the Constitution would admit of the exercise of such a power, a new law is
necessary for the purpose since no part of the existing law applies, this alone is
sufficient to justify my determination in the present case.
Id.
46
See, e.g. Alden, 527 U.S. at 720 (“The States, in particular, responded with outrage to the
decision.”).
47

Id. at 721 (A constitutional amendment which would have granted the states extensive
immunity in federal court had been immediately proposed in the House of Representatives but
was not acted on.) See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 111 (citing GAZETTE OF THE UNITED
STATES 303 (Feb. 20, 1793)). (Souter, J., dissenting). The amendment, proposed by Theodore
Sedgewick of Massachusetts provided that,
[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial courts,
established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at
the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or
foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United
States.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 111.
48

Alden, 527 U.S. at 721.

49

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

50

See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (“the text of the Amendment would appear to
restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
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Amendment had implications for state sovereign immunity beyond this textual
construction of its terms was the subject of Hans v. Louisiana.51
Hans, like Chisholm, was a federal court suit brought by an individual in federal
court against a state to compel payment on the state’s debt obligations.52 The State
of Louisiana had issued coupon bearing bonds in 1874 and concurrently amended its
constitution to declare that the bonds created a valid contract by the state.53 In 1879,
the state adopted a new constitution which superseded the previous constitution and
provided that interest on the 1874 bonds falling due on January 1, 1880 would be
defrayed to meet other state expenses.54 Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, held bond
coupons affected by this provision and sued the state in federal court for $87,500
plus accrued interest.55 He alleged an impairment of a valid contract by the state in
violation of Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution.56 Louisiana
contended it had sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and the trial
court dismissed the suit on that basis.57
Whereas Chisholm involved a state law claim brought against Georgia by a
citizen of another state, Hans involved a federal constitutional claim brought against
Louisiana by one of its own citizens. Hans thus presented the Court with two
distinct questions. Hans first contended that the Eleventh Amendment by its terms
barred only diversity jurisdiction in federal courts and had no application when a
federal question was being contested.58 He noted that Article III extends federal
judicial power to “all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution” with no
qualification as to the character of the parties.59 Consequently, Hans contended that
“a state can claim no exemption from suit, if the case is really one arising under the
Constitution.”60
The Court rejected this limited reading of the Eleventh Amendment, citing as
precedent the cases of Louisiana v. Jumel,61 Hagood v. Southern,62 and In re Ayers.63
Those cases involved similar constitutional claims brought against states by citizens
of other states. The Court summarized these precedents by stating “[i]t was not

51

134 U.S. 1 (1890).

52

See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.

53

See id. at 2.

54

See id. at 2-3.

55

See id. at 3.

56

Id. (The Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.).
57

See Hans, 134 U.S. at 3-4.

58

See id. at 9.

59

Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.).

60

Id.

61

107 U.S. 711 (1883).

62

117 U.S. 52 (1886).

63

123 U.S. 443 (1887).
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denied that they presented cases arising under the Constitution [rather than diversity
jurisdiction alone]; but, notwithstanding that, they were held to be prohibited by the
[Eleventh Amendment].”64
This position gave rise to Hans’ second argument which was that even if the
Eleventh Amendment applied to federal question jurisdiction, it did not serve to bar
his suit because the “amendment only prohibits suits against a state which are
brought by the citizens of another state.”65 The Court conceded “[i]t is true the
amendment does so read,”66 but rejected the argument nonetheless. On this point,
the Court initially noted that because it had extended Eleventh Amendment
immunity to federal question suits, if Hans’ argument was upheld, it would produce
the “anomalous result” that in such cases, “a state may be sued in the federal courts
by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens
of other states.”67 However, the Court primarily supported its decision with the
broader argument that the states entered the Union with sovereign immunity and that
this immunity had not been abrogated by the Constitution.68
To support this broader argument, the Court drew on the positions taken by
Hamilton, Madison and Marshall during the ratification debates,69 and Justice
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm. The Court characterized the Chisholm decision as an
overly textual misconstruction of Article III which was inconsistent with the
underlying principle of state sovereign immunity.70 It viewed the Eleventh
Amendment as an overruling of the Supreme Court on this point. Thus, in the
Court’s view, the Eleventh Amendment did not establish or define the limits of state
sovereign immunity; rather, because it specifically reversed the Chisholm decision,
the Court understood the Amendment to confirm the existence of a broader
immunity.71
The rationale behind Hans, that the principle of state sovereign immunity in
federal court was not specifically limited by the precise text of the Eleventh
Amendment, was expanded in subsequent cases.72 In Smith v. Reeves73 the Court
64

Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

See id. at 16. (“The suability of a state, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the
law.”).
69

See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.

70

See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
The [concurring] justices were more swayed by a close observance of the letter of the
constitution, without regard to former experience and usage; and because the letter
said that the judicial power shall extend to controversies 'between a state and citizens
of another state;' and 'between a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects,' they felt
constrained to see in this language a power to enable the individual citizens of one
state, of a foreign state, to sue another state of the Union in the federal courts.
71

See id. at 11-12.

72

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 728.

73

178 U.S. 436 (1900).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/6

8

2000]

ALDEN v. MAINE AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

511

held that sovereign immunity barred federal court suits against states brought by
federal corporations.74 In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,75 the Court held that
states were similarly immune to suits brought by foreign states.76 In Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak,77 the Court relied on Monaco to further extend the states’
federal court immunity to cover suits brought by Indian Tribes,78 and, in In re New
York,79 the Court held that state sovereign immunity extends to suits in admiralty
even though “the [Eleventh] Amendment speaks only of suits in law or equity.”80
While the cases in the Hans line espoused the principle of a broad state sovereign
immunity, the cases, like Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, still did not squarely
address the question of whether Congress has the power to abrogate this immunity.81
In the federal court context, that question was addressed and initially answered in the
affirmative in two key cases.
The first, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,82 involved a suit filed in federal district court by
employees of the State of Connecticut against various officials of that state.83 The
employees alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.84 In 1972, pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,85 Congress
had amended Title VII to specifically authorize private suits of this type.86 The
district court granted the plaintiffs a prospective injunction but denied money
74

See Reeves, 178 U.S. at 449.

75

292 U.S. 313 (1934).

76

See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330-31.

77

501 U.S. 775 (1991).

78

See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 780-82.

79

256 U.S. 490 (1921).

80

New York, 256 U.S. at 497. Further refinements of the Hans doctrine were provided by
the cases of Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). In Hall, the State of Nevada was named a defendant in a
civil suit brought in a California state court. The California Supreme Court held that the trial
court had proper jurisdiction and following a trial, judgment was entered against Nevada. See
Hall, 440 U.S. at 411-12. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a state’s
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to suits brought in the
courts of another state. See id. at 426-27. More recently, in Pennhurst, the Court held that a
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a federal court, in an exercise of pendent
jurisdiction, from enforcing a state’s own laws against officials of that state when the state
itself is the real party in interest. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121.
81
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996). (“It is true that we
have not had occasion previously to apply established Eleventh Amendment principles to the
question whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity . . .”).
82

427 U.S. 445 (1976).

83

See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring).

84

See id. at 448.

85

Section 5 grants Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5.
86

See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49.
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damages on state sovereign immunity grounds.87 The Court of Appeals affirmed on
this point.88 The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether “Congress
ha[d] the power to authorize federal courts to enter . . . [an award of money damages
to a private individual] against [a] state as a means of enforcing the substantive
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" or whether such power was precluded by
the “shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment.”89
The Bitzer majority, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, acknowledged the
principle of state sovereign immunity set forth in Hans, but held that this otherwise
effective immunity was specifically limited by the authority granted to Congress by
the Fourteenth Amendment.90 As explained by the Court, the Civil War
Amendments represented a “shift in the federal-state balance” and granted Congress
the power to intrude into the states’ spheres of autonomy with respect to matters
embraced by those Amendments.91 Applying this view to the facts at hand, Justice
Rehnquist wrote “[w]e think that Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate
legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”92
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment but rejected the notion of a broad
constitutionally based state sovereign immunity. In Justice Brennan's view, the
states, by ratifying the Constitution, had surrendered their immunity with respect to
all of the enumerated powers granted to Congress.93 Justice Brennan believed
Congress could have validly enacted the legislation under either its Commerce
Clause or Fourteenth Amendment powers.94 In a separate concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Brennan on this point, writing, “the commerce
power is broad enough to . . . provide[] the necessary support for the 1972
Amendments to Title VII.”95 This commerce power question was put squarely
before the Court in the second key case, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.96
Union Gas was an appeal by the State of Pennsylvania of a federal court of
appeals decision finding the state subject to a private suit97 brought pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

87

See id. at 450.

88

See id.

89

Id. at 448.

90

See id. at 456.

91

Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455.

92

Id. at 456.

93

See id. at 457-58 (Brennan, J. concurring).

94

See id. The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have power to . . . regulate
commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
95

Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring).

96

491 U.S. 1 (1989).

97

See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6.
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(CERCLA).98 Congress enacted CERCLA and the subsequent Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)99 pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers to provide a mechanism to clean up hazardous waste sites.100
In the district court, Pennsylvania argued that the private claim against it was
barred by its Eleventh Amendment immunity.101 The Court of Appeals ultimately
rejected this argument, holding that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly
expressed congressional intent to subject states to private suits for monetary damages
and that Congress had the power to do so under the Commerce Clause.102 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in a plurality decision which again
revealed the two opposing views in the Court on the sovereign immunity debate.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, in an
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court set forth the “pro-congressional
power” view. He began by noting that, although the Court had never “squarely
resolved” the question of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority vis-a-vis state
immunity, the relevant precedent, including Fitzpatrick, supported a decision in
favor of congressional power.103 The fundamental underpinning of Justice Brennan's
argument was that, “in approving the commerce power, the States consented to suits
against them based on congressionally created causes of action.”104 Justice Brennan
stated:
Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the
same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional
power thus conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render
States liable in damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave
Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their
immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority,
to render them liable.105
Justice Brennan rejected the idea that Hans conflicted with or precluded this
conclusion. He noted that while Hans had indeed upheld a principle of sovereign
immunity, it had not tested the question of whether that immunity was constitutional
98

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994). CERCLA provided for the hazardous waste “Superfund”
program.
99
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9613
(1994).
100
See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7. The United States sued Union Gas Company under
CERCLA to recover costs of an environmental cleanup (the country’s first “Superfund” site)
and Union Gas filed a third party complaint against Pennsylvania, alleging that the State was
at least partially liable for the costs. See id. at 6.
101

See id.

102

See id.

103

See id. at 14-15. Justice Brennan also cited Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama
Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) and Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
104

Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 22.

105

Id. at 19-20.
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in nature or whether, as federal common law, it was subject to abrogation by
Congress.106 Expanding on this point in his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
wrote that, while the diversity jurisdiction immunity granted to the states by the
literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, (the Amendment’s “legitimate scope”) is
constitutional in nature and beyond congressional power, all subsequent extensions
of the Eleventh Amendment via the Hans line of cases are nothing more than nonconstitutional judge-made law and subject to change by Congress.107
Justice White concurred in the decision but wrote separately to express his view
that CERCLA did not include a sufficiently clear statement of Congress’s intent to
abrogate state immunity.108 However, conceding that this view had not prevailed, he
voted to affirm stating, “I agree . . . that Congress has the authority under Article I to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states”.109
The “pro-immunity” or federalism point of view was argued by Justice Scalia in
his dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and
Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia rejected a straight textual interpretation of Article III
and the Eleventh Amendment in favor of a recognition of certain background
postulates which must be taken into account when interpreting the meaning of the
Constitution.110 He argued that one such postulate was the principle of sovereign
immunity and that, while the states had surrendered some aspects of this immunity in
ratifying the Constitution, they had not surrendered immunity to suits by private
individuals.111 Because, in Justice Scalia’s view, this retained immunity was a
background assumption under which the Constitution was adopted, such immunity
possessed a constitutional dimension and thus could not be abrogated by statute.112
Justice Scalia argued that Hans served to validate his argument, stating:
What we said in Hans was, essentially, that the Eleventh Amendment was
important not merely for what it said but for what it reflected: a consensus
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . was part of the understood
background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its
jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away.113

106

See id. at 18-19.

107

Id. at 23-24 (Stevens, J. concurring).
It is important to emphasize the distinction between our two Eleventh Amendments.
There is first the correct and literal interpretation of the plain language of the Eleventh
Amendment . . . In addition, there is the defense of sovereign immunity that the Court
has added to the text of the Amendment in cases like Hans v. Louisiana.
Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
108

See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 55-56 (White, J. concurring).

109

Id. at 57.

110

Id. at 32-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

111

Id.

112

Id. at 33-34.

113

Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Thus, in Justice Scalia’s view, “state immunity from suit in federal courts is a
structural component of federalism” which cannot be abridged by Congress pursuant
to its Article I powers.114
Justice Scalia distinguished Fitzpatrick on the grounds that the law in question in
that case had been enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority
rather than its Article I powers. Because the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike Article
I, had been adopted subsequent to the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Scalia
contended that, with respect to its provisions, it represented a surrender by the states
of the background principle of sovereign immunity embodied by the Eleventh
Amendment.115
Seven years later, the Court reconsidered the Article I/Commerce Clause
question in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.116 The two opposing views
remained the same but the makeup of the Court had shifted in favor of the federalism
position.117 Consequently, the Court overturned Union Gas118 and set out the rule
that Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, may not authorize private suits for
money damages against unconsenting states in federal courts.119 The decision led
one lower federal court to complain: “It is unfortunately a tragic consequence of the
Supreme Court's inability to maintain the status of its own precedents that all this
time and effort has been wasted. Compare Seminole Tribe (holding that Congress
lacks power) with Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. . . . (upholding Congress's
power).”120
Writing for a majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by the other Union Gas
dissenters Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy as well as Justice Thomas,
defended this deviation from the general principle of stare decisis. Initially, the
majority characterized Union Gas as a “deeply fractured” plurality decision, noting
that Justice Brennan’s Union Gas opinion had been joined by only three other
justices and that Justice White, who had provided the decisive vote, had written a
separate opinion “in order to indicate his disagreement with the plurality’s
rationale.”121 Additionally, citing the lower court decision in Seminole Tribe itself
114

Id. at 38.

115

Id. at 41-42.

116

517 U.S. 44 (1996). The petitioners in Seminole Tribe had brought suit against the State
of Florida in federal district court alleging violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. § 2701-21 (1994), which Congress had enacted pursuant to its (Indian) Commerce
Clause powers. Id. at 52-53.
117
In 1990, Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan; in 1991, Justice Thomas replaced
Justice White; in 1993, Justice Ginsburg replaced Justice Blackmun.
118

See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.

119

Id. at 73.

120

Mills v. Maine, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D.Me. 1996) (citations omitted).

121
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64. It may not be accurate though, to imply that Justice
White’s purpose in writing separately was to express his disagreement with Justice Brennan’s
views on the Commerce Clause question. While it is true that Justice White wrote separately
in Union Gas, his opinion was devoted almost entirely to his argument that CERCLA as
amended by SARA did not contain an unmistakable statement of congressional intent to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states. Justice White devoted just two
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along with one other case, the majority stated that Union Gas had “created confusion
among the lower courts.”122 Finally, Justice Rehnquist complained that Union Gas
had “deviated sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially
eviscerated our decision in Hans.”123 This last point may be the most telling in that it
highlights the incompatibility of Union Gas with the majority’s view of the Hans
line of cases.
While Seminole Tribe effectively cut off the federal courts as a forum for suits
against unconsenting states by private individuals under Commerce Clause
legislation, the case did not directly address the related question of Congress's power
to authorize such suits in state courts. This state court question had, however, been
previously considered in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission.124
Hilton was a private suit against an arm of the State of South Carolina which
operated a railroad engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier.125 The
petitioner, Kenneth Hilton, was an employee of the railroad who sought to recover,
pursuant to the terms of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),126 for alleged
job related injuries.127 FELA provided that “[e]very common carrier while engaging
in commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce.”128 A similar FELA claim brought in
federal court had been upheld against a state sovereign immunity defense in the 1964
case of Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department.129 The
Parden Court had held that, by referring to “every common carrier” in FELA,
Congress had intended to create a cause of action against even state-owned
railroads130 and further, that by operating a railroad in interstate commerce a state

sentences to the question of whether the Commerce Clause grants Congress this abrogation
authority, stating:
This brings me to the question whether Congress has the constitutional power to
abrogate the States’ immunity. In that respect, I agree with the conclusion reached by
Justice Brennan . . . that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree with much of
his reasoning.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J. concurring). By the same token, Justice White’s
statement does not necessarily support the conclusion that the Union Gas plurality opinion
was “deeply fractured” because Justice White did not elaborate on the nature of his
disagreement with Justice Brennan’s reasoning.
122

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64.

123

Id.

124

502 U.S. 197 (1991).

125

Id. at 199.

126

45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).

127

Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199.

128

Id. at 201 n.1.

129

377 U.S. 184 (1964).

130

Id. at 190.
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implicitly consented to FELA suits and waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
defense.131
Against the background of Parden, Hilton initially filed his suit in federal district
court. However, while Hilton’s suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court in Welch
v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,132 effectively held that
FELA did not contain a statement of congressional intent to abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity which was sufficient to support the constructive
waiver theory of Parden,133 and Parden was consequently overruled to the extent it
was inconsistent with Welch.134
In light of Welch, Hilton refiled his suit in South Carolina state court. The state
trial court dismissed the suit and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.135 The
basis for the dismissal was not that the state had immunity, but that FELA did not
create a cause of action against the state in state court.136 The South Carolina
Supreme Court, relying on Welch’s holding that FELA did not contain language
sufficiently clear to create a cause of action in federal courts, concluded that the
statute likewise did not sufficiently evidence congressional intent to create a cause of
action against the states in state court.137
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Hilton, then, was whether
FELA “create[d] a cause of action against a state-owned railroad, enforceable in state
court.”138 The Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court and held that the
statute did create such a cause of action and ordered that Hilton's suit be allowed to
proceed.139 The Court acknowledged the decision in Welch but stated that the
“unmistakably clear language” test for determining whether Congress intended to
abrogate state immunity in federal courts was not necessarily dispositive in

131

See id. at 192.

132

483 U.S. 468 (1987)

133
See Welch, 483 U.S. at 472. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985), the Court held that, when acting pursuant to its authority under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could only abrogate state immunity in federal court “by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Id. at 242. In applying
this test to Welch, the Court assumed arguendo that Congress’s power to abrogate state
immunity was not limited to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.
Because FELA did not pass the “unmistakably clear language” test, it was not necessary to
resolve any additional constitutional question and the Court expressly refrained from deciding
whether Congress had abrogation power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Id. at 478 n.8.
134

See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.

135

Hilton, 502 U.S. at 200.

136
See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 306 S.C. 260 (1990). The South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed in a one paragraph opinion, citing its decision in the essentially
identical case of Freeman v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 302 S.C. 51 (1990).
137

Freeman, 302 S.C. at 55.

138

Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199.

139

Id. at 207.
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determining whether Congress intended to impose monetary liability on the states.140
Thus, the Court noted that Welch had overruled Parden only with respect to its
Eleventh Amendment (federal court) waiver theory but not with respect to Parden’s
closely related holding that Congress intended to include state-owned railroads
within FELA’s terms.141 The Court stated that, in recognition of stare decisis, it
would not “reexamine this longstanding statutory construction.”142
Although the direct question in Hilton was one of statutory construction,
underlying the decision was the assumption that Congress can create a private cause
of action for money damages, good against the states in state court, if it so intends.
If this had not been the case, the discussion of congressional intent would have been
superfluous. The decision itself makes clear this underlying assumption. After
explaining that a “clear statement inquiry” was not required because Parden had
already established that Congress, in enacting FELA, “intended to create a cause of
action against the states,”143 the Court stated “when the rule [of a clear statement of
congressional intent] is either overcome or inapplicable so that a federal statute does
impose liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in
every State, fully enforceable in state court.”144
Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia, did not
contend that states have immunity from federal question suits in their own courts.
Rather, she argued that the “clear statement” test was applicable and had not been
met. Justice O’Connor wrote, “a federal statute requiring the States to entertain
damages suits against themselves in state courts is precisely the kind of legislation
that requires a clear statement, because of the long-established principle that a State
cannot normally be sued in its own courts without its consent.”145 Justice
O’Connor’s primary argument was that the decision in Welch, finding no
“unmistakably clear” statement of congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity, mandated a similar finding with respect to whether FELA
created a valid private cause of action against a state in the state’s own courts.146 She
rejected the idea that the two inquiries were not the same.147 Thus, the dissenting
opinion also rested on the assumption that Congress does have the power to abrogate
a state’s immunity in state courts if the “clear statement” standard is met.
The meaning of Hilton with respect to other assertions of state immunity in state
courts was evaluated differently by lower courts in subsequent cases. In the 1998
case of Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education, Vocational and Technical
Education Division,148 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a private federal question
140

Id. at 205-06 (differentiating between “application of a rule of constitutional law” and
“an ordinary rule of statutory construction”).
141

Id. at 204-05.

142

Id. at 202.

143

Hilton, 502 U.S. at 200.

144

Id. at 207.

145

Id. at 208 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

146

Id.

147

Id. at 208-09.

148

962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998).
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suit against the State of Arkansas, holding that Hilton had established that states have
no constitutional sovereign immunity superior to the Supremacy Clause.149 That
same year, in an essentially identical case, Alden v. State,150 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine reached a conflicting conclusion, ruling that state sovereign
immunity did prevail in the state's own courts when the state is sued for violating a
federal statute.151 The Maine court acknowledged Hilton, but held that, in the light of
Seminole Tribe, Hilton was no longer dispositive of the question.152
III. THE DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
153

Alden v. Maine, like Jacoby, its Arkansas counterpart, involved a claim against
a state pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).154 The FLSA was
enacted by Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers and imposes standards
such as minimum wages and maximum hours on all covered employers.155 Prior to
Alden and Seminole Tribe,156 the FLSA had been the subject of a series of Supreme
Court cases testing the threshold question of whether application of the FLSA to the
states was a valid exercise of the commerce power or whether implicit constitutional
principles of state sovereignty served to make the states immune to federal
Commerce Clause regulation when the states acted in performance of their
governmental functions. This question was broader than the question subsequently
raised in Alden, of whether state sovereign immunity precludes congressional
authorization of private suits for damages against the states as a means to enforce the
FLSA.
As originally enacted, the FLSA excluded the states from its requirements. In
1966 Congress amended the law to cover employees of hospitals, institutions and
schools, including those operated by the states or their political subdivisions.157 In
Maryland v. Wirtz, Maryland and twenty-seven other states challenged this
expansion of the Act on grounds of state sovereignty.158 Specifically, the states
argued that an otherwise valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power is
unconstitutional when it interferes with the states in “the performance of
governmental functions.”159 The Court specifically rejected the idea that the
149

Id. at 775-76.

150

715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998).

151

Id. at 175 (“[W]e conclude that sovereign immunity protects the State from defending
this federal cause of action in its own courts.”).
152

Id.

153

527 U.S. 706 (1999).

154

29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1994).

155

See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1968).

156

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

157

Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 185-87.

158

Id. at 187.

159

Id. at 195.
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commerce power is inferior to state sovereignty when that power is used to regulate
state governmental functions.160 Finding the FLSA to be a valid exercise of the
commerce power, the Court upheld the 1966 amendments.161
Eight years later, the Court reconsidered the question in National League of
Cities v. Usery.162 National League of Cities was a challenge to 1974 amendments to
the FLSA which had the effect of expanding the law to cover almost all state
employees.163 As in Wirtz, the appellant States argued that the law transgressed
recognized constitutional principles of state sovereignty.164 This time the Court sided
with the states. In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court overruled
Wirtz165 and held that Congress may not, pursuant to its commerce power, directly
regulate the states in areas involving traditional government functions.166 Contrary to
Wirtz, the Court in National League of Cities concluded that the federal system of
government set forth in the Constitution implicitly precluded such regulation.167
Rather than settling the matter, the decision in National League of Cities led to a
dispute between the federal government and the states, and disagreement in the lower
courts, as to which state activities constituted traditional government functions and
were thus immune from regulation under the Commerce Clause. This question
reached the Supreme Court in the 1985 case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.168 In Garcia, the Court overruled National League of Cities and
rejected the “traditional government function” test as unworkable.169 The Court
stated that any scheme which required characterization of state governmental
functions as “traditional”, “integral” or “necessary” as a prerequisite for immunity
from federal regulation would be incompatible with constitutional principles of
federalism in that the ultimate immunity decision would inevitably be made by an
unelected federal judge.170 In effect, the federal judiciary would be passing judgment
on whether or not it favored a particular state policy. The Court stated that a judicial
role of this type “disserves principles of democratic self-governance”171 and
explained further that the Constitution protected state sovereign interests by giving
the states a role in the selection of the national government, not through “judicially
created limitations on federal power.”172 Garcia then, by removing the commerce
160

Id.

161

Id. at 188.

162

426 U.S. 833 (1976).

163

Id. at 836-37.

164

Id. at 841.

165

Id. at 855.

166

Id. at 852.

167

National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851.

168

469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).

169

Id. at 531.

170

Id. at 546.

171

Id. at 547.

172

Id. at 552.
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power limitations established in National League of Cities, appeared to have cleared
the way for private FLSA suits against the states.173 Little did the Garcia majority
know that in doing so, the Court had helped to set the stage for Alden.
The Alden litigation originated in federal district court as Mills v. Maine.174 That
suit was filed in 1992 by probation officers employed by the State of Maine seeking
overtime pay pursuant to the FLSA.175 In 1996, in the wake of Seminole Tribe, the
district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, leading to that
court's bitter complaint about the failure of the Supreme Court to follow its own
precedent.176 The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.177
Subsequently, John Alden and other probation officers filed the Mills complaint
in Maine Superior Court in 1996.178 The Superior Court dismissed the suit on the
basis of state sovereign immunity and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.179
Because this decision conflicted with that of the Arkansas court in Jacoby, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to squarely address whether the
states have an immunity to private suits in their own courts comparable to the federal
court immunity set out in Seminole Tribe.180
B. The Decision
Alden was argued before the Supreme Court in March of 1999, three years after
Seminole Tribe was decided, and in many ways Alden parallels that earlier decision.
As in Seminole Tribe, the Court favored the “federalism” position, and affirmed the
decision of the Maine court to dismiss Alden's suit. The Alden decision was carried
by the same five to four majority which prevailed in Seminole Tribe181 and many of
the arguments on both sides of the case had been employed or foreshadowed in
Seminole Tribe, or earlier, in Union Gas.182
1. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that Congress does
not have the power under Article I of the Constitution to “subject nonconsenting

173

The Garcia plaintiffs never prevailed on their claim though. On remand the district
court refused to apply the Supreme Court decision retroactively and the appellate court
affirmed. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 838 F.2d 1411 (5th Cir. 1988).
174
Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3 (D.Me. 1993); Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551 (D.Me.
1994); Mills v. State, 1996 WL 400510 (D.Me. 1996).
175

See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998).

176

See supra text accompanying note 120.

177

See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997).

178

See Alden, 715 A.2d at 173.

179

See id.

180

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).

181

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 710.

182

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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states to private suits for damages in state courts.”183 Although this holding was
announced in terms of a limitation on Congress’s powers under Article I, it is
perhaps more descriptive to characterize it as crystalizing a new unwritten state
immunity element of the Constitution.184 Because the remedial provision of the
FLSA on which the Alden petitioners relied conflicted with this unwritten element,
that part of the FLSA was unconstitutional and struck down. The decision expands
the concept of the “underlying postulate” of state sovereign immunity from that of a
federal court immunity anchored in the Eleventh Amendment as per Seminole Tribe,
to a broader federal and state court immunity which is “confirmed” by the language
of the Tenth Amendment and independent of the Eleventh Amendment.185
The Court summarized its position and rationale for the decision by stating that
immunity from private suit was a “fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the
states enjoyed” prior to ratifying the Constitution and that this immunity continues
“except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
amendments.”186 In the Court’s view, neither the powers granted to Congress by
Article I, nor the Supremacy Clause, nor the jurisdictional grants of Article III
constituted an effective alteration of this “fundamental aspect” of state sovereignty.
The Court supported its position with two primary arguments.187 Initially, and
most fundamentally, the Court contended that state sovereign immunity having the
parameters established in Alden, was an “original understanding” upon which the
Constitution was ratified. To buttress this original intent argument, the Court
advanced the structural argument that a Congressional power to abrogate this state
immunity would be inconsistent with the system of divided state and federal
authority set out by the Constitution. Throughout its opinion, the Court also drew
support from history and precedent, canvassing its prior immunity decisions
beginning with Hans188 to find both a “settled doctrinal understanding” that state
sovereign immunity is implicit in the Constitution189 as well as “theory and reasoning
. . . suggest[ing]” that this immunity extends to state courts.190 These arguments are
summarized in more detail in the following sections.
a. Original Intent
According to the Court's historical analysis, at the time of ratification, the English
Crown had enjoyed an unqualified immunity from suit,191 and, although Americans
183

Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.

184

See, e.g., id. at 739-40 (“[T]he Constitution reserves to the States a constitutional
immunity from private suits in their own courts which cannot be abrogated by Congress.”).
185

See id. at 712-14.

186

Id. at 713.

187

See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (referring to the Constitution’s history and structure).

188

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

189

Alden, 527 U.S. at 728.

190

Id. at 745.

191

See id. at 715 (Quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 23435, (1765).
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“had rejected other aspects of English political theory,” this English concept of
sovereignty had been universally adopted by the states.192 Reflecting this underlying
assumption, the Court began its discussion of original intent by stating “[t]he
generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from
private suit central to sovereign dignity.”193 As evidence of this, the Court cited
Alexander Hamilton’s statement in The Federalist No. 81 that the states would retain
their sovereign immunity unless it was surrendered pursuant to plan of the
convention, as well as the supporting statements of James Madison and John
Marshall made at the Virginia ratifying convention.194 The Court drew further
support from the fact that several states, prior to ratification, had proposed
amendments or issued declarations designed to limit or eliminate any language in
Article III which appeared to impinge on state immunity.195
Of course, one significant event in the historical record which might directly
contradict the idea that an unconditional state immunity was a fundamental view of
the founding generation is the Chisholm196 decision. Just five years after ratification,
when directly presented with the question, four of the five Supreme Court justices
concluded that the provisions of Article III describing federal court jurisdiction over
the states, precluded any conflicting state immunity.197 Consequently, an essential
component of the Court's rationale, both in Seminole Tribe and Alden, was that
Chisholm was an incorrect decision and contrary to a true fundamental understanding
of the founders.
As in Hans a century earlier, the majority described the Chisolm decision as
resulting from an overemphasis on the text of Article III, with insufficient weight
given to “either the practice or the understanding that prevailed in the States at the
time the Constitution was adopted.”198 In contrast, Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent,
with its focus on then existing state practice, is cited throughout Alden as reflecting
the true implicit constitutional design.199 Consistent with this idea, the Court stated
that the Chisholm decision created “profound shock” in the nation and cited
statements to this effect from both the Massachusetts and Georgia legislatures.200 As
primary proof of its position, though, the Court pointed to the subsequent enactment
of the Eleventh Amendment, noting the “swiftness and near unanimity with which
. . . [it] was adopted.”201

192

Id.

193

Id.

194

See id. at 716-18; see also, supra text accompanying notes 17-21.

195

See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text; Alden, 527 U.S. at 719 (referring to “the
expressed understanding of the only state conventions to address the issue in explicit terms.”).
196

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).

197

See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.

198

Alden, 527 U.S. at 721.

199

See, e.g., id. at 720.

200

Id.

201

Id. at 724.
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In the Court's view, the Eleventh Amendment served not to create an immunity
limited to diversity actions in federal courts but, rather, to restore the original
constitutional design which implicitly included a broader “English” type of
immunity good against any suit brought by an individual against a state. The Court
specifically rejected as unsupportable the idea that Chisholm was a correct
interpretation of the Constitution and that the Eleventh Amendment therefore,
constituted a change to the constitutional design.202
Finally, as circumstantial support for its original intent argument, the Court
looked at early congressional practice to provide contemporaneous evidence of the
Constitution's meaning. In this inquiry, the Court uncovered no instance in which an
early Congress enacted a statute which would have subjected nonconsenting states to
private actions in state courts. From this fact, the Court inferred that early
Congresses had assumed they did not have the power to authorize such suits.203
b. Structuralism
Consistent with its original intent position, the Court argued that the
constitutional system of divided state and federal authority is incompatible with a
congressional power to subject states to private suits in their own courts. In the
Court’s view, congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in this way
would jeopardize the federal structure by tipping the balance of power too strongly in
favor of the federal government.
The Court noted that the Constitution reserves a “vital role” for the states in the
“fundamental processes of governance.”204 This can be seen both in those textual
provisions of the Constitution which expressly mention the states and assume their
continued existence, and in the fact that the Constitution grants only limited powers
to the federal government.205 Further, the Tenth Amendment confirms “the
constitutional role of the states as sovereign entities.”206 These aspects of the
constitutional design “reserve[] to . . . [the states] a substantial portion of the
Nation’s primary sovereignty” and entitle[] them to “the dignity and essential
attributes” of sovereignty.207 The states, therefore, exist as sovereign bodies, not
“mere provinces or political corporations,” and when operating within their sphere of
sovereignty, the states are supreme and independent of the federal government.208 On
this foundation, the Court argued that granting Congress the power to subject the
states to private suits in their own courts would create an unacceptable compromise
of constitutional federalism.

202

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 721-22.

203

See id. at 744.

204

Id. at 713.

205

See id.

206

Id. The Tenth Amendment provides that “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
207

Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.

208

Id. at 715.
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Initially, the Court described a direct threat to state sovereignty, noting that
private suits could create unacceptable financial burdens on the states, thereby giving
Congress a leverage over state governments which would not be consistent with the
constitutional design.209 Ultimately, in the Court's view, such suits could effectively
constitute a federal power to “comandeer the entire political machinery of the State
against its will and at the behest of individuals.”210 Additionally, by blurring the line
between federal and state authority, and by pitting state judiciaries against the states'
political branches, a congressional power to subject states to private suits in their
own courts would directly affect the political accountability of state governments
which is central to our system of representative democracy. On this point, the Court
stated that private suits would place an “unwarranted strain on the States' ability to
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens.”211
As a second structural point, the Court noted that whereas the Articles of
Confederation had provided for regulation of the states as political entities, the
founders had deliberately rejected that system in favor of one in which the Congress,
concurrently with the states, regulates the citizenry directly.212 Consequently, in the
Court's view, even when the federal government is operating within its own sphere
(i.e., within its constitutional powers), Congress may be precluded from acting
directly upon or through the states.213
This position served as the basis for the Court's rejection of the petitioners’
argument that the powers of Congress enumerated in Article I, together with the
Supremacy Clause, evidenced a relinquishment by the states of any sovereign
immunity they might have had with respect to suits brought under federal law. The
Court pointed out that while the Supremacy Clause makes federal acts the supreme
law of the land, binding on judges in every state, the Clause only applies to laws
made pursuant to the Constitution.214 Because the FLSA215 and similar laws would
violate the implicit constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, they can not
be said to have been enacted pursuant to the Constitution and, so, are outside the
aegis of the Supremacy Clause.216 The Court applied this same reasoning with

209

See id. at 750.

210

Id. at 749.

211

Id. at 750-51.

212

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (quoting J. MADISON, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION of 1787 9 (1911)) (“In this the founders achieved a deliberate departure from the
Articles of Confederation: Experience under the Articles had ‘exploded on all hands’the
‘practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies.’”).
213

See id. (“[E]ven as to matters within the competence of the National Government, the
constitutional design secures the founding generation’s rejection of ‘the concept of a central
government that would act upon and through the States’”).
214
See id. at 731. The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
215

29 U.S.C. § 201-207 (1994).
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respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause, essentially arguing that any law which
violates state sovereign immunity is not a “proper” exercise of congressional
power.217
c. Precedent
Throughout its opinion, the Court drew on prior decisions in the Hans line of
cases (“authoritative interpretations by this Court”218) to support its positions.219
Although conceding that these earlier cases dealt directly only with immunity in
federal courts, the majority argued that the logic of the decisions is equally
applicable to litigation in state courts.220 Accordingly, the majority cited extensively
to prior cases to establish that “[t]he theory and reasoning of our earlier cases suggest
the states do retain a constitutional immunity in their own courts.”221 Despite its
reliance on these precedents, the Court acknowledged that the rationales underlying
prior immunity cases were not always consistent with respect to the state court
question,222 and attempted to reconcile, dismiss or distinguish the various cases
which appear to conflict with Alden. Of these, the Court singled out Hilton v. South
Carolina Public Railways Commission223 and Nevada v. Hall224 as meriting more
than just a brief comment.225
Nevada v. Hall dealt with the issue of whether one state can be sued in the courts
of another state (rather than in its own courts) and, on the basis of that factual
difference, the Court argued that language from the case was not relevant to the
question presented in Alden.226 Hilton, on the other hand, did deal directly with the
state court question presented in Alden and the Court acknowledged that the case

216
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732 (“The Constitution, by delegating to Congress the power to
establish the supreme law of the land when acting within its enumerated powers, does not
foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising under federal law merely because
that law derives . . . from the national power.”).
217
See id. at 732-33 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997)). The
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power “to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing [Article I] powers.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
218

Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.

219
See, e.g., id. at 727-28 (citing Hans, Seminole Tribe, Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) and many others).
220

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 733.

221

Id. 745-46 (citing 13 cases in support of this proposition).

222

See id. at 735 (“There are isolated statements in some of our cases suggesting that the
Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable in state courts.”).
223

502 U.S. 197 (1991); see supra text accompanying notes 124-47.

224

440 U.S. 410 (1979); see supra note 80.

225

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 736.

226

See id. at 739. (“The decision addressed neither Congress’s power to subject States to
private suits nor the States’ immunity from suit in their own courts.”).
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could be read to support the petitioners' position.227 However, the Court found
several ways to distinguish Hilton, first noting that because the respondent in Hilton
had not advanced sovereign immunity as a defense, that issue had not been squarely
presented.228 The Court also seemed to imply that the concept of waiver of immunity
or consent to suit which had supported the Parden decision in the federal court
context (prior to Welch), had in some way been a factor in the Hilton decision.229
Finally, the Court characterized Hilton as having been simply a pragmatic decision to
uphold stare decisis in light of the substantial reliance by states and workers on
FELA.230
The Court effectively tied together its “prior decisions” arguments by stating that
it is “settled doctrine” (i.e., “settled” by Seminole Tribe) that the states possess a
sovereign immunity in federal court which Congress can not abrogate under its
Article I powers and, that its prior decisions imply that the states retain an equivalent
immunity in their own courts. Thus when considered together, these two ideas lead
to the conclusion that states possess an immunity in their own courts which is
superior to Congress’s Article I power.231
d. Conclusion
In concluding its opinion the Court stressed the fact that state sovereign
immunity to private suits would not render the states completely immune to federal
regulation and noted several ways in which states could still be subject to judicial
review of their compliance with federal law.232 States might, for example, voluntarily
consent to private suits and their consent to suits brought by the federal government
is implicit in the Constitution.233 Additionally, as per Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,234 the
states’ sovereign immunity does not extend to private causes of action created by
Congress under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.235 Finally,
the Court pointed out that sovereign immunity applies only to states and not to lesser
entities such as municipal corporations, and that state officers, under the doctrine of
Ex parte Young,236 could be subject to private suit as individuals.237

227
See id. at 737. (“There is language in Hilton which gives some support to the position
of petitioners here”).
228

See id.

229
See id. In distinguishing Hilton, the Court stated: “Furthermore, our decision in Parden
was based on concepts of waiver and consent. Although later decisions have undermined the
basis of Parden’s reasoning . . . we have not questioned the general proposition that a State
may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit.” See Alden, 527 U.S. at 737.
230

See id.

231

See id. at 748.

232

See id. at 755.

233

See id.

234

427 U.S. 445 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 82-95.

235

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.

236

209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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2. The Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion which was joined in by the other Seminole Tribe
dissenters,238 Justice Souter rejected the Alden decision in its entirety. The dissent
contested each element of the Alden majority's position and concluded that the
decision was indefensible and unrealistic.239
a. Original Intent
Justice Souter devoted the bulk of his dissent to contesting the Court's original
intent argument. In this regard, he first considered the nature of the state sovereign
immunity which was set forth in the majority’s opinion and then he examined
whether there is any evidence that such a concept of immunity was so fundamental
to the founding generation that it should be held to be implicit in the constitutional
design.
In relation to the first point, Justice Souter argued that despite the majority’s
references to an English origin for the American concept of sovereign immunity of
the states, the immunity established in Alden is not actually consistent with the
principles on which the sovereignty of the English Crown was based.240 Specifically,
drawing from Blackstone, Brackton and other authorities, he contended that English
immunity was a common law concept under which “no feudal lord could be sued in
his own court.”241 In England, Acts of Parliament declared the Crown imperial and
there was no court above the King’s, thus no writ could run against him.242 This was
the common law basis for the King's immunity. On the other hand, the sovereign
immunity of the states established in Alden, exists even beyond their own courts and
is indefeasible by statute. Thus, this type of sovereign immunity could not
historically have been an incorporation or continuation of the traditional
understanding in England.
In light of this inconsistency with the English common law concept of sovereign
immunity, Justice Souter examined the contours of the immunity established by the
majority and concluded that what the Court had found to be implicit in the
constitutional design was the “natural law” concept of sovereign immunity, under
which immunity from private suits is seen as an inherent and absolute element of the
sovereignty of the states.243

237

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57. The Court’s final concluding point was a finding that
the State of Maine had not waived its immunity or consented to Alden’s suit. See id.
238

See id. at 760. Justice Souter was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer.

239

See id. at 761 (Souter, J. dissenting) (“On each point the Court has raised it is mistaken,
and I respectfully dissent from its judgment.”).
240

See id. at 762-63.

241

Alden, 527 U.S. at 765 n.3 (Souter, J. dissenting) (quoting 3 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 465 (3d ed. 1927)).
242
See id. (quoting 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d. ed.
1899)) (“[T]hat there happens to be . . . no court above his court is, we may say, an
accident.”).
243
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 767 n.6 (Souter, J. dissenting). In his Seminole Tribe dissent,
Justice Souter elaborated on the two sovereign immunity doctrines:
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Having defined the immunity in question, Justice Souter then posed what he saw
as the fundamental question: whether it could be said that this natural law view of
sovereign immunity was widely held in the pre-ratification era.244 He concluded that,
rather than showing a prevailing acceptance of a well-defined immunity, the
available evidence brought to light disagreement, uncertainty and ambiguity as to
whether state sovereign immunity existed and if it did exist, what its contours
were.245
In arriving at that conclusion, Justice Souter first looked at early American
history, noting that prior to independence, the American Colonies were not sovereign
entities and that some colonial charters were held by corporations or entities which
were subject to suit.246 Following independence, two states adopted as constitutions
existing charters which provided for suit against the state,247 while other states
appeared to have incorporated the common law immunity of England.248 Justice
Souter summarized this historical information as indicating that “[a]round the time of
the Constitutional Convention . . . there existed among the states some diversity of
practice with respect to sovereign immunity,” but he found no evidence that any state
had adopted the natural law type of immunity.249
With respect to the Constitutional Convention itself and the ratification debates,
Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the subject of the immunity of a state in
its own courts was not specifically addressed.250 However, while the majority took
this as evidence that such immunity was so well settled as to be beyond discussion,251
Justice Souter’s view was that the silence on the issue simply indicated that the
founders never specifically considered whether state courts might be forums for
federal question suits against the states.252
The issue of state sovereign immunity in the federal courts was discussed at the
ratification debates though, and Justice Souter acknowledged the statements by
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall which indicate that state immunity in federal fora
would be maintained under the Constitution. However, he pointed out that other
The one rule [natural law] holds that the King or the Crown, as the font of law, is not
bound by the law’s provisions; the other [common law] provides that the King or
Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in its own courts . . . . The one rule
limits the reach of substantive law; the other, the jurisdiction of the courts.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 103 (Souter, J., dissenting).
244

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 763.

245
See id. at 764 (“There is almost no evidence that the generation of the Framers thought
sovereign immunity was fundamental in the sense of being unalterable.”).
246

See id. (Souter, J. dissenting).

247

See id. at 769. The states were Connecticut and Rhode Island. Id.

248

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 769-70.

249

Id. at 772.

250

See id. at 772-73 (Souter, J. dissenting).

251

See id. at 741-42.

252

See id. at 772 (Souter, J. dissenting). “[T]he issue was not on the participants' minds
because the nature of sovereignty was not always explicitly addressed.” See Alden, 527 U.S.
at 772 n.12.
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notable debate participants such as Edmond Randolph, James Wilson, and General
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney expressed opposing views.253 Further, even those who
argued that immunity would continue did not specifically address the nature of the
immunity about which they were talking, i.e., whether the immunity would extend to
federal questions and/or whether it would be defeasible by statute.254 Justice Souter
noted that even Hamilton’s statement in The Federalist No. 81 (that immunity to suit
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty) which seems to most directly support the
natural law view, is not entirely unambiguous, pointing out that Hamilton's statement
was a response to his own self-posed hypothetical question involving state contract
law (rather than a federal question)255 and that Hamilton qualified his statement by
allowing that there might be some surrender of this immunity in the constitutional
design.256
As a final point, Justice Souter considered the fact that some states, on ratifying
the Constitution, had issued statements of their understanding of Article III or
proposed amendments altering its terms. While the majority interpreted this as
evidencing a fundamental understanding of a sovereign immunity that Article III did
not abrogate,257 Justice Souter viewed it as evidence that those states either believed
that Article III as written did subject them to private suits, or at least considered the
meaning of Article III to be uncertain.258
Turning next to the Chisholm decision, Justice Souter argued that regardless of
the subsequent adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the significance of the
Chisholm decision to Alden is that it demonstrates that at the time of ratification
there was no general understanding “that a state’s sovereign immunity from suit in
its own courts was an inherent [natural law], and not merely a common-law
[defeasible by statute], advantage.”259 Justice Souter argued that while the five
Chisholm opinions displayed a divergence of view on the question, none of them, not
even that of Justice Iredell, espoused the “Hamiltonian” concept of an immutable,
constitutional state sovereign immunity.260 “This dearth of support,” Justice Souter
contended, seriously undercut the majority’s original understanding rationale.261
Consistent with his interpretation of the Chisholm decision, Justice Souter
rejected the majority’s position that the Eleventh Amendment serves to restore an
original understanding of the Constitution which includes Alden-type state sovereign
immunity. Justice Souter contended that because there was no such prevailing
253

See id. at 772-78. (“[O]n this point, too, a variety of views emerged and the diversity of
sovereign immunity conceptions displayed itself.”). Id. at 773.
254
See, e.g., id. at 778 (Souter, J. dissenting). (“[N]either of them [Madison nor Marshall]
indicated adherence to any immunity conception outside the common law”).
255

See id. at 773 n.13.

256

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 773 n.13.

257

See id. at 718-19.

258

See id. at 780 n.20 and accompanying text (Souter, J. dissenting).

259

Id. at 790.

260

See id. at 781.

261

Alden, 527 U.S. at 789.
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understanding at the time of ratification, that understanding could not have been reestablished by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.262 He viewed the Eleventh
Amendment as a fact-driven development in an evolving area of constitutional law
which served only to settle the limited question of citizen-state diversity jurisdiction
in federal court.263
To leave no stone unturned, Justice Souter also assumed arguendo that the natural
law theory of state sovereign immunity in state courts had in fact been the original
understanding of the founders, and asked whether that would justify the majority's
decision.264 He concluded that, even under that assumption, the decision would be
unsupportable because the natural law theory of sovereign immunity, as it was
known to the founders, was based on the proposition that a law can not be held
against the authority that made it.265 In England, where the Crown was then
considered the font of all law, the practical effect of the natural law theory would
have been no different from that of England’s common law based immunity.266
However, in the United States, the states were not the font of federal legislation.
Consequently, if the founders had intended to adopt the natural law theory of
sovereign immunity, it would not have implied an immunity from suits arising under
federal law, even if the suits were brought in the states’ own courts.267
Finally, addressing the Court's historical argument that early congresses had
never enacted legislation which would have authorized private suits against states in
state courts, Justice Souter was apparently willing to acknowledge the majority’s
claim that there may have been no such federal statutes to prior to FELA.268 Rather
than taking this as evidence that Congress lacks such power, Justice Souter explained
the absence of such statutes as the necessary consequence of an earlier belief that
Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the states
on certain subjects. Because Garcia had established that the States are subject to
federal law, even when acting in pursuance of traditional government functions, the
earlier record was not directly relevant in Justice Souter's view.269
b. Structuralism
Justice Souter disputed both of the majority's principal structural arguments.
First, he argued that while the system of federalism inherent in the Constitution
makes the States sovereign within their own spheres, it does not make them

262

See id. at 792-94 (Souter, J. dissenting).

263

See id. at 793-94.

264

Id. at 795-96.

265

See id. at 796.

266

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 765 n.4.

267

See id. at 798.

268

See id. at 804 (Souter, J., dissenting).

269

See id. at 804-07. “[T]he dearth of prior private federal claims entertained against the
states in state courts does not tell us anything, and reflects nothing but an earlier and less
expansive application of the commerce power.” Id. at 806.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000

29

532

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:503

sovereign with respect to the powers delegated to the federal government.270
Consequently, he rejected the Court’s position that private suits are inconsistent with
constitutional federalism because they might threaten political accountability or
fiscal health within the states. In Justice Souter’s view, if such a threat to a state
were to arise, it would only be due to a state's contravention of the will of the entire
nation in an area within the federal power. In such a situation, any resulting strain on
the state should be seen as the intended effect of the federal system.271 Similarly,
Justice Souter dismissed the majority's contention that the states’ sovereign dignity
must be protected, arguing that sovereign dignity was a concept which developed in
the context of monarchies and, hence, is completely out of place with a republican
state.272
The dissent also contested the majority’s second structural point that because the
Constitution grants power to the federal government to directly regulate the
citizenry, it precludes federal regulation of the states. Justice Souter argued that the
problem with the Articles of Confederation, which necessitated the Constitutional
Convention, was that the federal government had too little power to bind the states,
not too much.273 The fact that the Constitution gave the federal government certain
limited powers to circumvent the states and regulate the people directly does not
mean that the federal government is precluded from any direct regulation of the
states themselves.274 Indeed, Justice Souter pointed out that the applicability of the
FLSA to the states had already been settled by Garcia.275
c. Precedent
As might be expected, the dissent's reading of Supreme Court precedent is also at
odds with that of the majority. Justice Souter argued that, like Seminole Tribe, Alden
is inconsistent with Garcia and serves to make the FLSA substantially
unenforceable.276 Additionally, Justice Souter contended that the decision is
inconsistent with Hilton, noting that the Court in Hilton did not even hint at any
constitutional bar to the suit against South Carolina, and, further, that if such a bar
had existed, the Court would not have had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case.277
As for Hans and the other cases in that line relied on by the majority, Justice
Souter did not cover them directly, referring instead to his dissent in Seminole Tribe
where he discussed the cases at length.278 In the Seminole Tribe dissent, Justice
270

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 800 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The State of Maine is not sovereign
with respect to the national objective of the FLSA.”).
271

See id. at 800-03.

272

See id. at 802-03.

273

See id. at 776 n.16.

274

See id. at 809 n.39.

275

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 808-09 (Justice Souter suggests that the Alden decision has
vitiated Garcia). See id. at 810.
276

See id. at 809-11.

277

See id. at 804 n.37.

278

See id. at 762.
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Souter had argued that the purpose behind the Eleventh Amendment was to address
the pressing concern of the states that federal jurisdiction over common law diversity
suits would defeat their ability to repudiate Revolutionary War debts.279 In extending
the specific diversity jurisdiction language of the Amendment to cover federal
question suits as well, the Hans Court made a fundamental error which “destroyed
the congruence of the judicial power under Article III with the substantive
guarantees of the Constitution.”280
The error was continued and extended
throughout the Hans line and, finally, in Seminole Tribe erroneously elevated from
common law to constitutional status.281 Justice Souter offered evidence that the
“great weight of scholarly commentary agree[d]” with this view.282
Finally, Justice Souter noted that in recognizing a principle of sovereign
immunity as in Alden, the Court had abandoned the traditional belief that “where
there is a right, there must be a remedy.”283 He concluded by analogizing the Court's
position on state sovereign immunity to the economic substantive due process
doctrine of the Lochner era284 and predicted that the Seminole Tribe/Alden doctrine
would be equally fleeting.285
IV. ANALYSIS
286

In Seminole Tribe, the question was the extent of Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers, in relation to the question of federal jurisdiction. On the one hand,
Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction over states in certain private suits and, on
the other hand, the Eleventh Amendment limits this jurisdiction. In this context, the
Court viewed the specific text of the Eleventh Amendment as being just one aspect
of a broader principle of state sovereign immunity which is an unwritten part of the
constitutional design. Although it is this broader concept of immunity rather than the
precise text of the Amendment which barred the suit against the state of Florida, the
279

See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 112-13 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).

280

Id. at 119.

281

See id. at 124-27.

282

Id. at 110 n.8.

283

Alden, 527 U.S. at 811.

284

The Lochner era, named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was
characterized by a laissez faire judicial philosophy under which economic rights, such as
freedom to contract, were held to be constitutionally protected liberty interests. The era came
to an end in the mid-1930s when the Court, under political pressure engendered by the great
depression, began upholding state economic regulations. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS
M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 829-35 (1996).
285

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 814.
The resemblance of today’s state sovereign immunity to the Lochner era’s industrial
due process is striking. The Court began this century by imputing immutable
constitutional status to a conception of economic self-reliance that was never true to
industrial life and grew insistently fictional with the years, and the Court has chosen to
close the century by conferring like status on a conception of state sovereign immunity
that is true neither to history nor to the structure of the Constitution.
Id.
286

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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decision was nevertheless expressly limited to federal courts and it can thus be
properly seen as an extension of the Hans287 line of Eleventh Amendment cases.
In Alden,288 though, federal jursidiction was not an issue. Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment were not actual points of contention and there was no express
constitutional jurisdiction question. The case constituted a more direct test of the
extent of Congress's Article I power in connection with the Supremacy Clause and
implicit structural notions of federalism. Article III and the Eleventh Amendment
were implicated in the case only to the extent that they shed light on the true issue
presented in Alden, which was whether there was in fact a fundamental
understanding of state sovereign immunity held by the founding generation which
should be held to be part of the constitutional design and, if so, what the nature of
that understanding was and what the contours of the immunity should be.
The Court noted both the similarity and difference between Alden and the Hans
line of cases, at one point differentiating Alden state court immunity as a “separate
and distinct structural principle . . . not directly related to the scope of the judicial
power established by Article III,”289 but later aligning Alden with the prior cases by
stating that the logic of the Hans line of cases can be extended to cover the question
in Alden.290 In extending the original intent logic of Hans and Seminole Tribe to find
a constitutional immunity unsupported by any actual textual provision of the
Constitution (other than the broad language of the Tenth Amendment), Alden
represents a clear demonstration of the power of originalism as a method of
constitutional interpretation and provides an opportunity to examine originalism as
applied.
It is true that the Court also relied on structuralism and precedent to support its
decision. These arguments, though, can be seen as secondary to, and contingent
upon, the original intent rationale. For example, in rejecting the structural argument
that the Supremacy Clause made the FLSA the supreme law of the land, the Court
reasoned that the Act was unconstitutional, and thus outside the scope of the
Supremacy Clause because it was inconsistent with the original understanding of the
founders.291 Clearly the Court’s position here rests entirely upon the original intent
argument. With respect to precedent, the cases relied on by the Court amount to
circumstantial support at best. As the majority acknowledged, the question in Alden
had never before been squarely presented.292 Original intent then, clearly serves as
the primary theoretical underpinning for the decision.
In his 1989 essay Originalism, the Lesser Evil,293 Justice Scalia set out both the
purported advantages of originalism (as opposed to non-originalist “values” based
theories of constitutional interpretation), as well as the methodology required to
287

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

288
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Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.
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Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 (“Whether Congress has authority under Article I to abrogate a
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properly apply originalism. On the first point, Justice Scalia argued that if the
Constitution were assumed to have no fixed and ascertainable meaning, but were
instead, an “invitation to apply current societal values,” then the legislature, not the
courts, would be the appropriate body to ascertain constitutional meaning.294 For this
reason, non-originalism could be said to undermine the whole doctrine of judicial
review first set forth in Marbury v. Madison,295 which rests on the idea that it is the
duty of the courts to ascertain the meaning of the law.296
To realize the advantages of originalism, however, the doctrine must be properly
employed, and on this point Justice Scalia stated that the “greatest defect” of
originalism is “the difficulty of applying it correctly.”297 It is this second concern,
the proper application of originalism, that can be seen as the main point of contention
between the majority and the dissent.
In his essay, Justice Scalia noted that, in the case of constitutional interpretation,
originalist doctrine requires consideration of an enormous body of evidence, such as
the records of the state ratification debates, along with an assessment of the
reliability of such evidence.298 Accordingly, the Alden Court did appear to consider a
large body of material from the founding period and the majority clearly identified
the specific evidence of original intent on which it relied. This consisted of “the
views expressed by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall during the ratification debates,
and by Justice Iredell in his dissenting opinion in Chisholm,”299 the positions of the
“only state [ratification] conventions formally to address the matter,”300 and the
“events leading to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.”301 Additionally, the
Court stated as historical fact that the states had adopted from England “the doctrine
that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent” and that this doctrine was
“universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”302
While this evidence might seem convincing when first read, all of it is
contradicted by the dissent, either through equally credible but conflicting
interpretations or by presentation of the dissent's own equally credible but conflicting
evidence.303 Clearly the two positions can not be reconciled. However, Justice
Scalia's essay offers some further guidelines which help in evaluating the opinions
under originalism principles. Justice Scalia stated that proper application of
originalism requires “immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere
of the time,” factoring out information not known in the earlier period, and adopting
the “beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, predjudices and loyalties” of the time in
294
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295
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question.304 In at least two areas, the thinking behind this admonition seems to favor
the dissent rather than the majority opinion.
First, with respect to the ratification debates, both the majority and the dissent
agreed that whatever was said about state sovereign immunity was said in the context
of the then pressing issue of potential suits to enforce Revolutionary War debt
repayment.305 The majority presented no evidence that any of their cited speakers
had considered, or intended to take a position on, immunity when federal regulation
based on the Commerce Clause was at issue. The same point can be made with
respect to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. While it is beyond doubt that
the Amendment was intended to eliminate citizen-state diversity jurisdiction in
federal court and the debt enforcement such jurisdiction threatened, it is something
else again to read into that intent a generally held awareness or concern that some
day federal laws enacted by Congress under the Commerce Clause might directly
regulate the states, and an understanding that the states were to be inherently immune
from any private suits that might result. By taking statements and actions out of their
actual ratification era context and applying them to today’s questions, the Court
seems to be violating Justice Scalia’s originalism guideline.
The second area where Justice Scalia’s rule is useful is in considering the
majority's contention that the original states uniformly adopted from English
precedent a sovereign immunity which was indefeasible, good in both state and
federal courts and on both state and federal questions. The majority supports this
position with statements from Hans, Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, Hamilton’s
comments in The Federalist No. 81, and Blackstone's description of the sovereignty
of the English Crown.306 However, none of these statements are truly “on point” and
must be read in the light of subsequent events, such as Commerce Clause legislation
to provide support for the majority’s position.
Justice Souter, in contrast, appears to be more diligent in following Justice
Scalia’s admonition to take into account the attitudes and beliefs of the time. He
noted that prior to independence, the American Colonies had no sovereignty of their
own,307 and that, following independence, the Constitution set out an unprecedented
system of government which split “the atom of sovereignty.”308 Consequently, even
assuming that the original states had adopted an English concept of sovereign
immunity, there would have been no existing tradition or understanding as to how
that immunity would fit into the American federal system or what the limits of the
immunity would be. Against this background, Justice Souter presented evidence
which tends to paint a picture of disagreement or uncertainty among the founders
regarding the nature or extent of sovereign immunity rather than a well-defined and

304

Scalia, supra note 293 at 856-57.

305
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widely held understanding.309 Additionally, Justice Souter noted that no state had
declared in its constitution that sovereign immunity was an inalienable or natural
right.310
Another of Justice Scalia's comments is telling here. After noting the difficulty
of throwing off present-day prejudices and of taking on the attitudes of an earlier
time, he stated that the proper application of originalism is “a task sometimes better
suited to the historian than the lawyer.”311 The Court only partially heeded this
advice. For example, the majority cited to the works of legal historian David Currie
four times for support of its original intent arguments,312 but ignored his disclaimer
that “[t]his is not to say the [Chisholm] decision was necessarily wrong. Madison,
Marshall and Hamilton notwithstanding, there was no unanimity among the Framers
that immunity would exist.”313
Even if these first three originalism guidelines (consider the entire historical
record, take on attitudes of the period in question, and heed the historians) do not
provide sufficient criteria to evaluate Alden as an application of originalism, Justice
Scalia provides one other guideline which is directly relevant. He noted that one
way to identify a pseudo-originalist opinion is to find that it “ignor[es] strong
evidence of original intent that contradict[s] the minimal recited evidence of an
original intent congenial to the court’s desires.”314 While it may not be fair to
describe the majority's evidence as minimal, the amount of contradictory evidence
that is ignored or dismissed is so large as to fairly raise the question whether the
Court was, in fact, looking for an original intent congenial to its desires.
For example, while relying on Hamilton, Madison and Marshall, the majority
dismissed the views of Randolph, Wilson, and Pinckney as “scanty and equivocal
evidence.”315 The pre-Chisholm decision of Maryland to submit to process in Van
Stophorst v. Maryland316 and a similar decision by New York are dismissed as not
“reflect[ive] of a widespread understanding.”317 The early proposals by Virginia and
North Carolina to eliminate the citizen-state diversity jurisdiction language in Article
III are characterized as reflecting only a generalized dissatisfaction with federal
jurisdiction rather than a belief that Article III, as written, negated state immunity.318
The fact that the original constitutions of Connecticut and Rhode Island provided for
309
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suits against these states is said to confirm a uniform view of state sovereign
immunity rather than indicate some diversity of view on the subject.319
Of even greater significance, the Chisholm decision itself is written off as an
overly literal misinterpretation of the Constitution.320 In Chisholm, five prominent
members of the founding generation directly addressed the question and none of
them, not even Justice Iredell, stated a belief that the states have a constitutional
sovereign immunity.321 This would seem to be strong evidence that the founders had
no fundamental understanding to the contrary. The Alden majority dismissed
Chisholm, though, on the grounds that the Chisholm Justices, other than Justice
Iredell, had failed to address the prevailing understanding in making their decision.322
Not only might this be seen as specious reasoning (i.e., the decision was not a
reflection of the original understanding because it failed to take into account the true
original understanding), but, beyond that, it simply is hard to believe that the five
Chisholm Justices would have failed to recognize or credit a truly fundamental
understanding on the matter. Chief Justice Jay, for example, had been a co-author
with Alexander Hamilton of The Federalist. He surely would have known, better
than the Hans court of one hundred years later, exactly what Hamilton’s views were
and whether those views were so pervasively held as to be implicit in the
Constitution when it was ratified.
The majority, of course, pointed to the subsequent adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment as proving its argument that the Chisholm Court had failed to account
for a fundamental postulate of Alden-type immunity implicit in the constitutional
design. In doing so, however, the Court, as in Hans, was forced to dismiss
contradictory evidence yet again, that evidence being the plain language of the
Amendment itself, which addresses the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, not a
grander concept of immunity.
This conflict between the Hans/Seminole Tribe/Alden view of sovereign immunity and the language of the Constitution is not limited to a clash with the Eleventh
Amendment though. The plain text of Article III, as well as the Supremacy Clause,
must be likewise supplemented, adjusted or dismissed to conform to the view of
original understanding set forth in Alden. Like the Chisholm decision, the text of the
Constitution appears to present evidence, too strong to ignore, that there was no fixed
idea of absolute state sovereign immunity to private suits which was taken for
granted during the ratification era.323
In response to this conflict with the constitutional text, the Court, throughout its
opinion, warned that, in determining what the founders meant, you can not always
rely on what they said. With respect to the Eleventh Amendment and Article III, the
319
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Court rejected reliance on the “mere letter”324 or “bare text”325 of the law, the “mere
literal application” of the law,326 the “ahistorical literalism” of resting on the words
alone,327 and “blind reliance upon the text.”328 While this kind of wholesale
disparagement of textualism might be expected in an opinion based on what Justice
Scalia refers to as nonoriginalism,329 it does not seem consistent with the underlying
principle of originalism that the Constitution is “an enactment that has a fixed
meaning . . . ascertainable to those learned in the law.”330 In the context of Alden,
this continual denigration of the constitutional text has the effect of emphasizing the
underlying problem - which is that if the majority’s view is correct, we must assume
that the founders chose to express a fundamental understanding in language virtually
certain to create conflicting interpretations.331
Of course, all the conflicting evidence notwithstanding, it might still be
hypothesized that the Alden majority did in fact capture a true fundamental
understanding of the founding generation in their decision. Even according this
possibility a presumption of validity, though, the strong dissent of Justice Souter and
the apparent discrepancies between the majority's reasoning and the tenets of
originalism expounded by Justice Scalia, make it fair to consider whether there might
actually be a different explanation for the decision. In his essay, Justice Scalia
addressed such a possibility, noting that “the main danger in judicial interpretation of
the Constitution . . . is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the
law.”332 This thought is consistent with Justice Scalia’s earlier warning that
originalism can be misused to support a decision designed to set forth “an original
intent congenial to the court’s desires.”333 Both comments may well shed some light
on Alden, in that the Court's recent federalism decisions appear to show a definite
predilection for limiting federal power and expanding “states’ rights.”
In 1985, the Court decided Garcia which held that Congress could regulate the
states as states under its Commerce Clause power (barring some defect in the
national legislative process). The Court reasoned that the sovereignty of the states
324
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was properly protected by the prominent role in the national political process
accorded them by the Constitution, not through discrete limitations on congressional
power created by the judiciary. As the make-up of the Court began to change in the
1990s, however, that philosophy gave way to one which favored judicial
involvement so as to further direct limitations on Congress. This trend can be seen
in cases throughout the last decade.
In the 1992 case of New York v. United States,334 the Court held that the Low
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,335 requiring States to
either regulate disposal of radioactive waste produced in the state in accordance with
federal guidelines or take title to the waste, exceeded the limits of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.336 The Court found that the Act, through
coercion, effectively commandeered the state governments into federal regulatory
service in a way which was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and state
sovereignty.337 Five years later, similar reasoning was extended to cover individual
state officers in Printz v. United States.338 The Printz Court held that provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,339 requiring local law enforcement
officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers in
accordance with the federal statute’s mandate, constituted an unconstitutional
attempt to conscript state officers into service as federal regulatory agents.340 The
Court in Printz stated that such conscription was “fundamentally incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”341
In the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez,342 the Court struck down the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 1990, which made firearm possession in a school zone a federal
offense, on the ground that such a prohibition was not sufficiently related to
interstate commerce as to be valid legislation under the Commerce Clause. The
Court reasoned that any link between school zone gun possession and interstate
commerce was so attenuated that the Act could not be considered a rational
commerce regulation measure.343 Additionally, the Court warned of the danger of
allowing the Commerce Clause become the basis for a general federal police power
equivalent to the police power enjoyed by the states.344 The following year, Seminole
Tribe constitutionalized state sovereign immunity from private suits for damages in
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federal courts.345 Alden followed in June, 1999 and the Court’s trend can be seen in
other recent immunity cases.
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board,346 decided the same day as Alden, the Court held that Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act (TCRA), which amended the Trademark Act of 1946 to authorize
private suits against the states, was ineffective against state sovereign immunity.347
College Savings Bank argued that Congress enacted the TCRA pursuant to its
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, as per Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,348 state sovereign immunity should not serve to bar its TCRA based suit.349
The Court, however, found that the TCRA could not be seen as enforcing any
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment,350 rather, being just an exercise of Article I
power, the TCRA was not effective to abrogate state sovereign immunity (as per
Seminole Tribe).351 Additionally, the Court held that the State of Florida had not
effectively waived its sovereign immunity. In making this latter ruling, the Court
expressly overruled Parden352 to the extent it had survived Welch,353 and fully
repudiated the constructive waiver principle on which Parden was based.354
In the case of Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank,355 the Court held that the Patent and Plant Varieties Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act) which authorized private suits
against states to remedy patent law violations could not “be sustained as legislation
enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.”356 Consequently, the private suits authorized by the Act were barred by
state sovereign immunity.
345
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Most recently in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,357 the Court held that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), while valid legislation
under the Commerce Clause,358 was “not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”359 Consequently, as with the TCRA and
the Patent Remedy Act, the provisions of the ADEA which authorized private suits
against States were held to be unconstitutional violations of state sovereign
immunity.360 With the exception of New York v. United States, all of these cases
were decided by the same five-to-four majority that operated in Alden.
In the last eight years, then, Union Gas has been overturned, Hilton has been
effectively overturned, Garcia has been substantially undermined, the constructive
waiver theory of Parden has been overruled, the “substantial effects” test for
economic regulation under the Commerce Clause has been made more stringent
(Lopez), and congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment has been
repeatedly constrained. This record indicates a break with prior federalism decisions
and marks a more activist course which corresponds to the establishment of the
present political make-up of the Court's membership. Regardless of whether Alden is
considered to be substantively good or bad for the country, when viewed in light of
all the circumstances, the decision can be most realistically explained as a further
step along the Court's current political path rather than as a true determination of
some fundamental understanding of two hundred years ago.361
V. CONCLUSION
The record of the major federalism cases of the last decade reveals a sharp
ideological split within the Court on the nature and extent of state sovereign
immunity as well as the broader question of the role of the judiciary in protecting or
defining state sovereignty itself. As long as the present “federalist” majority is
maintained or increased, the course established in the 1990s is likely to continue. If
the make-up of the Court shifts in favor of the present dissenters, however, Seminole
Tribe362 and Alden363 are unlikely to survive. In a strong dissenting opinion in Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents,364 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, made it clear that he rejects Seminole Tribe as valid controlling
precedent.365
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Even if Alden and Seminole Tribe do survive the current membership of the
Court, the lack of textual support for state sovereign immunity as a constitutional
principle and the flexibility of the original intent doctrine as it was applied in Alden,
will continue to make the decisions subject to reversal.
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